




A raft of new philosophical problems concerning truth have recently
been discovered by several theorists, following [Fine, 2010]. Most previ-
ous commentators on these problems have taken them to shed light on
the theory of ground. In this paper, I argue that they also shed light
on the theory of truth. In particular, I argue that the notion of ground
can be deployed to clearly articulate one strand of deflationary thinking
about truth, according to which truth is “metaphysically lightweight.” I
offer a ground-theoretic explication of the (entirely bearable) lightness of
truth, and show how it yields a novel solution to the problems concerning
how truth is grounded. So, the theory of truth and the theory of ground
interact fruitfully: we can apply the notion of ground to offer a clear expli-
cation of the deflationist claim that truth is “metaphysically lightweight”
that both captures the motivations for that claim and solves the problems.
Few subjects have received more philosophical scrutiny than the nature of truth.
The attention is warranted by the centrality of truth to theorizing in many fields
and the problems that afflict systematic attempts to characterize it. Many of
those problems have long been recognized and discussed. But a raft of new
problems have recently been discovered.1 These problems concern the question
of how ascriptions of truth are to be grounded.
Most previous commentators on these new problems have drawn lessons
from them for the theory of ground. In this paper, I argue that we should also
draw lessons for the theory of truth more generally. In particular, I argue that
consideration of these new problems suggests a plausible way to more clearly
1See [Fine, 2010] for the original statement of the problems. See also [Litland, 2015, Correia,




articulate one strand of deflationary thinking about truth. According to this
strand of deflationism truth is “metaphysically lightweight,” in some sense badly
in need of explication. I will propose an account of the (entirely bearable) light-
ness of truth that is as clear as the notion of one fact’s obtaining in virtue of
another, and then show that the resulting, broadly deflationary view yields a
novel solution to the problems concerning how truth is grounded. So, if the pro-
posal I sketch is on target, the theory of truth and the theory of ground interact
fruitfully: we can apply the notion of ground to offer a clear explication of the
deflationist claim that truth is “metaphysically lightweight.” That explication
both captures the motivations for that claim and solves the problems.
I will begin by stating some background assumptions, and then I will ar-
ticulate the class of problems concerning how facts involving truth are to be
grounded. These problems center on certain puzzles due to [Fine, 2010], with
variations discovered by other authors. Switching tracks, I will next discuss
the motivations for the strand of deflationism on which truth is “metaphysically
lightweight.” I will propose a ground-theoretic account of the lightness of truth,
and argue that it captures the motivations for this strand of deflationism. Then,
I bring our two threads back together, applying the resulting, broadly deflation-
ist view to the problems concerning how truth ascriptions are grounded, and
describing the solutions that emerge. I will next discuss a second class of puz-
zles, due to [Litland, 2015], showing how the broadly deflationist view I have
articulated also solves those puzzles. Finally, I consider some objections and
offer concluding remarks on the significance of the discussion.
1 Setup
Before I state the puzzles, it is worth being explicit about my terminology and
background assumptions. Grounding is often said to be closely connected to a
certain sort of explanation.2 In philosophical parlance, however, ‘explanation’
is used to indicate a broad array of linguistic and extra-linguistic entities. This
is potentially confusing. So, for the sake of clarity I will use ‘explanation’ to
indicate a class of sentences (true or not) which deploy explanatory locutions.
For example,
(1) ‘There are human beings’ is true because there are human beings
2See [Dasgupta, 2014, Fine, 2010, Rosen, 2010] for classical expressions of the idea.
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is an explanation, in the sense I intend here. Moreover I will focus on what have
come to be called grounding explanations. Grounding explanations tell us what
obtains in virtue of what. Philosophers and scientists are fond of asking for ex-
planations of this kind: “In virtue of what is murder wrong?” “In virtue of what
am I justified in believing that I have hands?” “What makes diamonds hard?”
Answering any of these questions involves asserting a grounding explanation, in
the sense in play here.
The notion of ground has its critics.3 Nevertheless, I will persist. In part
this is because I think the criticisms don’t ultimately succeed [deRosset, forth-
coming]. Also, theorists of ground have, in my view, provided the clearest frame-
work within which to express and discuss the explanatory role of truth. This
work makes it particularly easy, as we will see, to state the broadly deflationist
view I propose. But there is another, less mercenary reason: it seems to me
that, even if the critics turn out to be right, some successor notion to grounding
is needed. The explanatory questions that appear to call for grounding expla-
nations and are posed in familiar philosophical and scientific investigations are
not going away. More particularly, the intuitions that motivate both the puzzles
and the strand of deflationism I will explore are not going away. If grounding
locutions are not suitable for framing and discussing the claim that truth is
“metaphysically lightweight,” then some successor notions obeying analogous
principles will have to serve instead.4 I will leave it to those who sympathize
with the criticisms to replace my talk of ground with whatever successor notions
are most suitable, and to assess the plausibility of the various principles that
result.
I will follow some now-standard notational conventions, writing ‘ψ1, ψ2, · · · <
φ’ to indicate full grounding. A sentence of this form says that ψ1, ψ2, . . . express
a complete inventory of grounds for φ, with no need for supplementation. So,
for instance,
(2) it’s snowy, it’s windy < it’s both snowy and windy
expresses the claim that its being snowy and its being windy are, collectively,
3See [Daly, 2012], [Koslicki, 2015], [Hofweber, 2009], [Sider, 2011, §§7.2, 8.2.1], [Turner,
2016], and [Wilson, 2014].
4Some of the critics agree. Sider [2011], for instance, is happy to use the ‘in virtue of’
locution; he just gives it an interpretation in terms of what he calls “metaphysical truth
conditions.” Wilson [2014] seems less happy with the ‘in virtue of’ locution, but she would
admit its appropriateness as a kind of generic stand-in for any one of an array of specific
notions that, in her view, do the metaphysical work in any particular case.
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a complete specification of some grounds for its being both snowy and windy.5
I will write ψ ≺ φ to indicate that ψ expresses a (perhaps improper) part of a
ground for φ. So, for instance,
(3) it’s snowy ≺ it’s both snowy and windy
says that it is both snowy and windy partly in virtue of its being snowy. I
will follow standard terminology in calling the notion indicated by ‘≺’ partial
ground.
What’s more, I will assume that every true grounding explanation is accom-
panied by an explanatory argument. That is, if a grounding explanation of the
form
(4) φ in virtue of the following facts: that ψ1, that ψ2, ...
is true, then there is an argument containing only truths whose conclusion is
φ, whose premises are ψ1, ψ2, ..., and in which each inference proceeds in the
correct direction, tracing the order of explanation. I will call such inferences ex-
planatory.6 I know of no helpful analysis of the distinction between explanatory
and non-explanatory inferences, nor of the closely related idea of proceeding in
the right direction (for grounding). But examples can help illustrate the idea.
Consider
(5) (Either it’s windy or it’s snowy) in virtue of the fact that it’s windy.
(5) is true. This explanation is accompanied by the one-inference argument
It’s windy
Either it’s windy or it’s snowy
This inference is, intuitively, explanatory: it traces the direction of dependence
and determination. Similarly, one way to tell that
(6) It’s windy in virtue of the fact that it’s windy and Apia is the capital of
Samoa
5This claim of full ground is consistent with there being distinct, equally complete specifi-
cations of grounds in terms, say, of a more detailed specification of atmospheric conditions.
6This assumption is shared with the deductive-nomological account of explanation [Hempel
and Oppenheim, 1948]. I am not, however, signing on to the deductive-nomological account
in detail; in particular, I do not require that the arguments in question be deductively valid,
nor that they be nomological – laws need play no special role. So, one way of summarizing
the import of my assumption is that I endorse the deductive-nomological account of explana-
tion, except to the extent that it is deductive or nomological. See [Litland, 2016, 2015] and




is not a true grounding explanation is to note that
It’s windy and Apia is the capital of Samoa
It’s windy
while valid, is not an explanatory inference. Finally, and most relevantly, Aris-
totle observed that
There are human beings
It is true that there are human beings
is an explanatory inference, but
It is true that there are human beings
There are human beings
is not.7 He is plausibly interpreted as concluding from this observation that,
while the truth of the claim that there are human beings and the existence
of human beings mutually entail one another, the existence of human beings
grounds the truth of the claim, rather than vice versa.
The explanatoriness of an inference, like its validity, does not require the
truth of either its premises or its conclusion. For this reason, an inference can be
explanatory even though the corresponding grounding explanation is not true.
Suppose it’s neither windy nor snowy. Then (5) is not true. Nevertheless, it’s
easy to tell that the argument in question contains only explanatory inferences.
That argument has what it takes to accompany a true grounding explanation,
so long as the facts cooperate. Similarly, you don’t need a weatherman to know
that (6) cannot be right.8
These examples show that, in at least some cases, we have a fairly firm grip
on the idea of an explanatory inference. Moreover, since an inference can be
explanatory without being sound, it is clear that our grip does not consist ex-
clusively in our grip on the truth of the corresponding grounding explanations.
As the falsity of (5) in a situation in which it’s neither windy nor snowy illus-
trates, being accompanied by an argument consisting of explanatory inferences
is at most a necessary condition for the truth of the corresponding grounding
explanation.
I will call an argument accompanying a grounding explanation an explana-
tory story. An explanatory story is step-wise good (or good, for short) iff each
claim it contains is possibly true,9 and each of its inferences is explanatory. So,
7Categories, 14b14-22, trans. J.L. Ackrill
8Thanks to Selim Berker for discussion of the issues raised in this paragraph.
9The restriction to possible truth is inserted to ensure that strange explanatory stories like
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we allow that the argument above involving conjunction elimination is an ex-
planatory story, but deny that it is a good one.10 An explanatory story whose
conclusion is φ is an explanatory story for φ. Thus, true grounding explanations
whose explanandum is φ are accompanied by good explanatory stories for φ.
Finally, I will assume that true sentences which figure in grounding expla-
nations express facts, and that a given grounding explanation is true iff there
is a grounding relation among those facts. On this picture, ground is, in the
first instance, a relation of dependence and determination among facts. When
a fact depends on and is determined by some other facts in the relevant way,
then a corresponding grounding explanation is true. I make this assumption
merely for the sake of convenience. We could state the puzzles, express the
deflationary theory I propose, and explore its merits by just talking about sen-
tences and other objects, and characterizing them as having certain features.
Mention of facts is, in principle, dispensable. But the resulting exposition would
be needlessly complex.
2 Puzzles concerning ground and truth
We are going to start by focusing on a central class of puzzles for the theory
of ground. The puzzles we will discuss each involve an argument from highly
plausible claims about ground and some innocent-looking assumptions to a claim
that something (partially) grounds itself. An assumption of the puzzles, then, is
Joe is the parent of
√
2√
2 has a parent.
do not turn out to be step-wise good. I will often suppress reference to this qualification in the
main text, since no explanatory story relevant to the main discussion contains impossibilities.
Thanks to Cian Dorr for pointing out the need for this qualification.
10The claim that an explanatory story is step-wise good does not entail that the argument
delivers any epistemic or pragmatic payoff to any particular audience, even when it contains
only truths. There may, for instance, be step-wise good explanatory stories that do not provide
any such epistemic or pragmatic payoffs, because, e.g., they are too complex or too long.
Thus, an explanatory story may be step-wise good without being intuitively good taken as a
whole. That is, the result of chaining (step-wise) good inferences may be an explanatory story
that, intuitively, is not good. The question of whether chaining intuitively good explanatory
arguments yields larger arguments that are (still) intuitively good recognizably implicates the
question of whether grounding explanations are transitive. (Technically, what is at issue is
whether grounding explanations obey a cut principle of the sort discussed in [Fine, 2012a]
and [deRosset, 2014, 2015].) Though the view I describe in this paper holds that grounding
explanations are transitive in the relevant sense, this is not an assumption used to pose the
puzzles introduced in §2. The assumption needed is that the explanatory arguments at issue
are step-wise good. Thanks to David Chalmers and an anonymous referee for discussion.
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that nothing even partially grounds itself. This assumption is highly plausible
on the conception of ground which is in play. Any explanation of the form
(7) φ because φ, ...
seems on its face transparently inadequate. The same goes, of course, for
grounding explanations. A claim of the form
(8) φ in virtue of the fact that φ, ...
seems clearly false. Thus, any ethicist who proposed that a certain act a is wrong
partly in virtue of being wrong would face an immediate charge of implausibil-
ity.11 If one nevertheless admits the possibility of partial self-grounding, then
the erstwhile puzzles may turn out to be results which specify conditions under
which something grounds itself.12
The puzzles involve good explanatory stories, where each inference in the
argument is, intuitively, explanatory. The first puzzle, due to Fine [2010], in-
volves two classes of apparently explanatory inferences. The first corresponds
to the general idea that an instance of an existential generalization is a ground
of the generalization. So, it seems, instances of
Existential Introduction φ(τ)
(∃x)φ[x/τ ]
are explanatory inferences. Thus, the inference from ‘Joe is a philosopher’ to
‘someone is a philosopher’ seems explanatory. The second class of apparently
explanatory inferences corresponds to the idea we gleaned from Aristotle, that
instances of
Truth-Introduction φ
it is true that φ
are explanatory. So, for instance, the inference from ‘there are human beings’
to ‘it is true that there are human beings’ is explanatory. Let T (p) abbreviate
‘the proposition p is true’, and let q be the proposition that something is true,
i.e., the proposition expressed by
(9) (∃x)T (x).
11Jenkins [2011] describes a view on which grounding can relate a fact to itself. Still, no
explanation of the form (8) is true on Jenkins’s view. Similarly, though Rodriguez-Pereyra
[2015] argues that there are reflexive instances of grounding, none of those instances are
reported by sentences of the form (8).
12Some authors urge just this view in response to the puzzles [Correia, 2014, Woods, 2018].
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The innocent-looking assumption is that q is true: some proposition is true.
This assumption is verified by the fact, e.g., that the proposition that 0 = 0
is true.13 Given our assumptions, the following is a good explanatory story




Given that each inference is explanatory and each sentence is true, it is difficult
to see how to avoid drawing the conclusion
(10) (∃x)T (x) ≺ (∃x)T (x).
Thus, the puzzle.
There is an obvious variant which is innocent of the theory of propositions,
but which appeals to a truth predicate for sentences. That version accepts that
instances of
STruth-Introduction φ S says that φ
S is true
(where S is a name for the sentence φ) are explanatory. Consider
(11) (∃x)x is true
where ‘is true’ is a truth predicate for sentences. The innocent-looking assump-
tion is that (11) is true. If so, we can chain explanatory inferences to yield the
following, good explanatory story containing only truths:
(∃x)x is true. (11) says that (∃x)x is true.
(11) is true.
(∃x)x is true.
Given that each inference is explanatory and each sentence is true, it is difficult
to see how to avoid drawing the conclusion
(12) (∃x)x is true≺ (∃x)x is true.
Again, we have a puzzle.
Krämer [2013] poses a similar puzzle involving quantification into sentential
position: there is a one-inference explanatory story in which ‘(∃S)S’ is derived
from itself using
13Fine offers another puzzle that uses the assumption that every proposition is either true
or not true [Fine, 2010]. This assumption will not look innocent to anyone familiar with the
vast literature on the law of the excluded middle and the semantic paradoxes. I don’t discuss





Since instances of SentQ Introduction, like instances of Existential In-
troduction, seem explanatory, we again appear to be under pressure to accept
a reflexive instance of partial ground.
So, we have a battery of puzzles.14 There are key differences among the
puzzles. In particular, each puzzle centers on a slightly different bit of vocabu-
lary and, as a result, involves different explanatory stories. Still, the similarities
among the puzzles are striking. Each of the puzzles involves an ascription of
truth or a truth-like notion.15 Each of them also appeals to plausible claims
about good explanatory stories and some innocent-seeming assumptions. It
would appear, then, that we face an unappetizing menu of options: deny that
the inferences in question are explanatory, deny the innocent-seeming assump-
tions, or accept that partial grounding has reflexive instances. In fact, as I will
show, there is a fourth kind of solution. Motivation for a solution of that kind is
to be found in a certain strand of deflationist thinking about truth. Let’s turn
our attention to that strand.
3 What is metaphysical “heft”?
A core idea of deflationism is that truth is, in a sense badly in need of expli-
cation, “metaphysically lightweight.” It is very unclear what the metaphor of
metaphysical “heft” comes to. A brief review of some extant explications of the
idea will highlight the difficulty of making it clearer. Horwich, a prominent de-
fender of deflationism, claims that truth is not a “complex” property, and that
no naturalistic analysis of it is either possible or necessary [Horwich, 1990, p.
39]. It is not clear how this would make truth “metaphysically lightweight.”
G.E. Moore, for instance, is famous for claiming that goodness is not suscepti-
ble of naturalistic analysis, and presumably he might be brought to agree that
it is not “complex” in the sense Horwich intends. But Moore’s view cannot
14Fine [2010] shows that similar puzzles arise concerning other truth-like notions, like that
of a fact’s obtaining. The solutions proposed below extend straightforwardly to these puzzles.
15The fact that Krämer’s puzzle involves a truth-like notion is obscured by the relative
unfamiliarity of the notation. On standard developments of the λ-calculus, ‘(∃S)S’ abbreviates
‘∃λS.S’, where the expression ‘λS.S’ is a sentential operator that we can gloss, roughly, as
being the case. Thus, ‘(λS.S)snow is white’ says, roughly, that it is the case that snow is
white, and, intuitively, ‘∃λS.S’ says that something is the case. The truth-like notion here is
being the case. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this obscurity.
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be characterized as claiming that “good” is “metaphysically lightweight” in any
reasonable sense.16
Some deflationists claim instead that truth is a logical property, and that
makes it “lightweight” [Horwich, 1990] [Field, 1992]. The idea is that we have
a predicate for truth in order to enable us to say things that could not be said
without substitutional quantification or infinitary conjunction. So, for instance,
it is impossible for us to say
(13) (Joe said that snow is white and snow is white) or
(Joe said that snow is purple and snow is purple) or
. . .
and make it through all of the claims that Joe might say. A truth predicate
usefully enables us to assert
(14) Joe said something true
instead. A truth-predicate is supposed to play this role by dint of the fact that
some collection of non-paradoxical instances of a T -schema taking some such
form as
E the proposition that φ is true iff φ; or
S pφq is true iff φ
are true.17 Deflationists need to say more, since if a deflationist theory can
include a given collection of non-paradoxical instances of a T -schema, then so
can, for example, a correspondence theory of truth. Deflationists typically claim
that there is nothing more to the nature of truth than is given by the relevant
collection of non-paradoxical instances of the T -schema; see [Moore, 2020] for
discussion.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how the fact that the truth predicate plays this
useful role bears on the question of its metaphysical “heft.” Given a consistent
system A of arithmetic, adding instances of the T -schema (S) (for the original
language), together with some innocent-seeming compositional principles con-
16This point is pressed in [Stoljar and Damnjanovic, 2014, §7.6].
17The statement of (E) is taken from [Horwich, 1990], and the statement of (S) from
[Shapiro, 1998]. McGee [1992] shows that the question of which collection of instances of
a T -schema are at issue is both urgent and difficult for this sort of deflationist.
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cerning truth, may yield a non-conservative extension of A.18 That is, adding
in the instances of (S) and the compositional principles allows us to derive new
consequences in the old language. This result strongly suggests that adding a
truth predicate governed by the T -schema adds expressive power that is, intu-
itively, substantial.19 So, granting the claim that truth is a “logical” property
in the relevant sense still leaves us in the dark regarding how truth is supposed
to be “metaphysically lightweight.”
Another strand of deflationist thinking holds that truth ascriptions are se-
mantically equivalent to the sentences to which truth is ascribed. So, for in-
stance, on this view
(15) ‘There are human beings’ is true
is semantically equivalent to
(16) There are human beings.
Call this view disquotationalism. There are a variety of classical expressions of
disquotationalism,20 and a great deal of controversy over its merits.
For present purposes, we can set these controversies to the side. Disquota-
tionalism is not the strand of deflationism we will be exploring. As we will see,
there is a way of developing the idea that truth is “metaphysically lightweight”
that does not incur the semantic, cognitive, and epistemic commitments that
make disquotationalism so controversial. Moreover, disquotationalism seems
18In particular, let A be a consistent, suitably strong, recursively axiomatizable system of
arithmetic in the language L. Expand L by adding a truth predicate ‘T ’. Add as axioms
all instances of the T -schema for L and compositional principles concerning truth like ‘for
any sentence φ not containing ‘T ’, T (p¬φq) iff ¬T (pφq)’ [Halbach, 2001, p. 184]. Finally,
understand the induction axiom schema to include instances containing occurrences of ‘T ’.
Then, the consistency sentence for the original system (A) is derivable. See [Shapiro, 1998]
for an intuitive argument and [Halbach, 2001] for a description of exactly which additional
axioms are required for the argument. Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful guidance.
19There are a variety of different, more precise characterizations of the idea that an extension
of A is conservative. The argument discussed in n. 18 shows that the addition of instances
of the T -schema and some innocent-seeming compositional principles governing truth fails to
be conservative on just one of those characterizations. There is significant controversy over
whether the deflationist claim that truth is “metaphysically lightweight” requires conservativity
in that sense. The existence of this controversy reinforces the point made in the main text,
since it stems in part from the unclarity of the idea that truth is “metaphysically lightweight.”
In particular, the claim that truth is “metaphysically lightweight” has not been understood
clearly enough to determine whether it requires the kind of conservativity over A that the
argument shows is lacking. The explanation of the sense in which truth is “metaphysically
lightweight” in §4 below does not require this kind of conservativity.
20See [Ayer, 1936], [Field, 1992], [Grover et al., 1975], [Quine, 1970], and [Ramsey, 1927].
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not to solve all of the problems presented by the class of puzzles we are consid-
ering. It appears to handle the first two puzzles, since a disquotationalist may
say that instances of Truth-Introduction and STruth-Introduction are
semantically equivalent to inference by repetition, and thus are not explanatory.
But it does not handle “postcard” cases, which appear to give rise to a puzzle
of essentially the same sort as those we have already posed.21 The puzzle uses





Conjunction Introduction φ ψ
(φ ∧ ψ)
Suppose we have a postcard with two sides, A and B. The sentence
(17) 0 = 0 ∨ (∃s)(s is written on B and s is true).
is written on side A, and
(18) (∃s)(s is written on A and s is true)
is written on B. The innocent-seeming assumption in this case is that (17) is
true, since 0 = 0. The following argument, then, seems like a good explanatory
story, assuming the disquotationalist’s view that ‘(17) is true’ is semantically
equivalent to ‘0 = 0∨ (∃s)(s is written on B and s is true)’ and ‘(18) is true’ to
‘(∃s)(s is written on A and s is true)’:
(17) is true (17) is written on A
(17) is written on A and (17) is true
(∃s)(s is written on A and s is true) (i.e., (18) is true) (18) is written on B
(18) is written on B and (18) is true
(∃s)(s is written on B and s is true)
0 = 0 ∨ (∃s)(s is written on B and s is true) (i.e., (17) is true.)
As before, it seems difficult to avoid drawing the conclusion
(19) (17) is true≺(17) is true.
And so, again, we have a puzzle.
So, the disquotationalist strand of deflationism does not help with this simple
variant of the original puzzle. We will be better served if we focus on the
21This argument is due to [Litland, 2015].
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strand which emphasizes the idea that truth is “metaphysically lightweight.”
Unfortunately, it remains mysterious what this idea might come to.
The mystery is lessened, perhaps, if we attend to the use to which deflationist
theories are put. Briefly, deflationism is used to show that truth ascriptions play
no robust explanatory role whatsoever. One might have hoped or feared that the
ascription of truth will play a key role in a variety of philosophically important
enterprises. For instance, one might have thought that truth ascription will play
an important role in explaining and defending realism about a certain swath of
discourse, the validity of certain logical inferences, or the nature and value of
successful inquiry. Deflationists have proposed that these issues are clarified
and progress made possible when we recognize that the role of truth in such
investigations is very minimal. Truth ascriptions have no explanatory role to
play, other than as devices to summarize and generalize over the claims to which
truth is ascribed. In an instance of (S) like
(20) ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white
the left-hand side exerts no explanatory oomph. Instead, its role in giving expla-
nations is exhausted by its serving to indicate those representation-independent
conditions which actually do the work.22 In this sense, adding quotation marks
and the ascription of truth to the right-hand side of (20) to get its left-hand side
is “metaphysically lightweight:” it adds nothing of any explanatory significance.
An example may help illustrate the plausibility of the idea that truth-
ascriptions play no robust explanatory role. One explanatory role claimed for
truth is that certain scientific theories are useful because they are true (or nearly
true). For instance, the GPS system, we may suppose, relies on the General
Theory of Relativity. It might be claimed that part of what makes the GPS
system useful is that that theory is true. However, deflationists have pointed
out that, if we have an explicit formulation of the General Theory of Relativity,
then the appeal to truth is otiose. Instead of saying that the GPS system is
useful in virtue of the fact that the General Theory of Relativity is true (or
nearly true), we should more perspicuously say that the GPS system is useful
in virtue of the fact that mass warps spacetime, etc.23 What makes the GPS
22See esp. [Field, 2004, p. 29] and [Horwich, 1990].
23This example is adapted from [Horwich, 1990, pp.49-50]. The centrality of the explanatory
vacuity of truth to deflationary views is also indicated by the fact that one of the most serious
worries about deflationism according to its proponents is that, when the representations we
deploy are true, their truth seems to explain our successful navigation of the world [Field,
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system useful are the features of physical reality, rather than the features of a
certain theory about physical reality. Appeal to the truth of a certain represen-
tational entity, the theory, serves simply to point us toward the relevant features
of physical reality when stating them is either impossible or inconvenient. In
this sense, the truth ascription is a mere placeholder for a statement of those
representation-independent physical conditions which actually make the GPS
system useful.
Call the claim that truth ascriptions play no robust explanatory role, but
serve instead to indicate those representation-independent conditions that ac-
tually do the explanatory work, the deflationist’s insight. It is worth dwelling
on the intuitive appeal of the deflationist’s insight. The GPS system consists
of a number of things, scattered around and above the surface of the Earth.
These things, working in concert, are poised to be of use to suitably equipped
people, who are also scattered around and above the surface of the Earth. The
General Theory of Relativity, by contrast, is presumably a proposition or a set
of propositions, and so is located either in Plato’s heaven, Frege’s Third Realm,
or, perhaps, nowhere at all. In any case, the General Theory of Relativity is
not located around here, where both the GPS system and its users are located.
It’s plausible to think that the theory is just not in the right place to make that
system useful, here and now, to its users. It is much more plausible, by con-
trast, to think that the features of that part of physical reality which contains
both the GPS system and its users are, in part, what makes it the case that the
system is poised to be of use.
However intuitively appealing the deflationist’s insight may be, it is obvi-
ously still in need of clarification and defense. This is where the notion of
ground can help. I will propose a ground-theoretic account of the lightness of
truth. This account yields a broadly deflationist view which is compatible with
a wide range of plausible semantics for truth ascriptions. As we will see, this
view differs from disquotationalist forms of deflationism in two ways. First,
it develops the thoroughly metaphysical strand of deflationism on which truth
is “metaphysically lightweight,” letting the semantic, cognitive, and epistemic
chips fall where they may. It thereby skirts the semantic, cognitive, and epis-
temic controversies attending disquotationalism. Second, it solves the puzzles




4 Truth as hollow
The theory I will describe is one on which truth ascriptions may be thought of as
“hollow vessels” so far as grounding goes. In particular, their role in grounding
is simply to stand in for the facts expressed by the claims or sentences to which
truth is ascribed. For ease of reference, I will call this theory HT, for “Hollow
Truth.” My description of HT specifies the role of truth ascriptions in grounding.
As we will see, that requires specifying both the role of the facts expressed by
truth ascriptions in grounding and the (slightly different) role such ascriptions
play in (good) explanatory stories. Let’s start with the role in grounding of the
facts expressed by truth ascriptions.
What grounds the facts expressed by truth ascriptions? As we have already
seen, it is highly plausible to think that, in a large class of cases, the facts
expressed by truth ascriptions are grounded in the facts expressed by the things
to which truth is ascribed. So, for instance, Aristotle is plausibly interpreted to
suggest that the fact stated by
(21) it is true that there are human beings
is grounded in that stated by
(16) There are human beings.
Thus,
(22) There are human beings < it is true that there are human beings
is a true grounding explanation. HT endorses this claim, and generalizes it to
corresponding ascriptions of truth to sentences: the fact stated by
(15) ‘There are human beings’ is true
is grounded in that stated by
(16) There are human beings
together with the facts concerning what the sentence ‘there are human beings’
says. So, on HT, both (22) and
(23) There are human beings ≺ ‘There are human beings’ is true
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are true.24 Call this claim Aristotle’s insight. It generalizes, of course, to a
broad class of other truth ascriptions.25 HT claims that, in a broad class of
cases, if a sentence P is true, and P says that φ, then
(25) φ ≺ P is true
and
(26) φ < it is true that φ
are both true grounding explanations.26
These commitments concern how facts reported by truth ascriptions are
grounded. But the heart of the idea that truth plays no robust explanatory role
concerns instead what those facts ground. HT holds that the fact stated by a
truth ascription plays no further role in grounding. In particular, no such fact
grounds anything. Once we have said how facts involving truth are grounded,
we have said all that there is to be said about their role in grounding.27 On
HT, for instance, the only role in grounding played by the fact stated by
(28) it is true that there are human beings
is that it is grounded by the fact stated by (16). In particular, the fact stated
by (28) plays no role in grounding any further fact. Nothing depends on and
is determined by that fact, in the sense at issue in grounding explanations.
24It might plausibly be thought that these two claims are related. One way of explaining the
relation is to endorse a full grounding claim corresponding to an instance of a minor variant
on STruth-Introduction:
(24) (‘There are human beings’ says that there are human beings, it is true that there are
human beings) < ‘There are human beings’ is true.
Then (23) can be obtained from (22) and (24) by the transitivity of full ground and a principle
relating partial and full ground, on which, if φ,∆ < ψ, then φ ≺ ψ.
25The generalization may be complicated by the presence of context-sensitive expressions
in the language [Heck, 2004]. I am assuming in what follows that we have fixed a context,
and are considering sentences and arguments evaluated with respect to that context.
26See n. 28 and n. 33 for an explicit delineation of the class of true instances of (25) and
(26).
27More precisely, HT says all there is to be said about what the fact stated by a truth
ascription grounds or is immediately fully grounded by; see [Fine, 2012b] for discussion of
the distinction between immediate and mediate grounds. There may be mediate grounds for
truth ascriptions that are yielded by Aristotle’s insight on plausible ancillary premises. For
instance, the truth of
(27) It is windy ≺ ‘it is either windy or snowy’ is true
is consistent with the theory I am describing.
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This is the sense in which the facts stated by truth ascriptions play no robust
explanatory role according to HT.28
This deflationary claim about the facts stated by truth ascriptions might
seem implausible in light of the fact that truth ascriptions appear to play a role
in explanatory stories. Consider again the question of what makes the GPS
system useful. A tempting proposal, recall, was to explain this (in part) by
appealing to the truth of the General Theory of Relativity. It is not completely
clear how the explanatory story that accompanies the envisioned grounding
explanation is supposed to go. Plausibly, it might involve the inference
The General Theory of Relativity is true
The GPS system is useful.
Suppose so.29 Then we appear to have a truth ascription playing a supporting
role in an explanatory story.30 If the structure of grounding relations among
facts mirrors the structure of explanatory inferences among sentences, then the
deflationary claim made by HT is false.
Plausibility requires, then, that HT identify a mismatch between the infer-
ential structure of explanatory stories and the structure of grounding relations
among facts. But we already have the notions needed to characterize that mis-
match. HT proposes that truth ascriptions can be premises in explanatory
inferences, but their function in such inferences is to stand in for their grounds.
Thus, though
The General Theory of Relativity is true
The GPS system is useful
is, we might grant, a good explanatory story, it does not accompany the ground-
ing explanation
(30) The General Theory of Relativity is true ≺ The GPS system is useful.
28 This aspect of the view requires exceptions to the schemas (25) and (26). For instance,
if P is itself a truth ascription, then, according to HT, the fact stated by P does not ground
anything, including the fact that P is true. Thus, on HT
(29) ‘There are human beings’ is true 6≺ ‘‘There are human beings’ is true’ is true.
HT systematically delineates the exceptions; see n. 33.
29For the sake of clarity, I have omitted from the statement of this inference certain ancillary
premises concerning, e.g., how the GPS system relies on the General Theory of Relativity.
Plausibly, those ancillary premises would be required to fill out the explanatory story.
30Similarly, Shapiro argues that truth ascriptions play an ineliminable role in good explana-
tory stories for the truth of the Gödel sentence for a given, recursively axiomatizable, suitably
strong system of arithmetic A [Shapiro, 1998, p. 505-6].
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Instead, since the truth ascription is standing in for its grounds, one should look
to the grounds of the truth of the General Theory of Relativity for grounds for
the utility of the GPS system. That is, one should conclude
(31) Mass warps spacetime, etc. ≺ The GPS system is useful.
We have already seen reason to suspect that, in the envisioned explanatory
story, the truth ascription
(32) The General Theory of Relativity is true
is a mere placeholder for non-semantic claims stating certain features of physical
reality. This suspicion turns out to be right on target, according to HT.
The view I have just described can be developed systematically, so that
its commitments fall out naturally. I have been presenting arguments in a
standard format: each argument is a (converse, rooted, decorated) tree whose
nodes contain sentences. The root of the tree (depicted at the bottom in the
standard format) contains the conclusion of the argument, and each occurrence
of a sentence is inferred from the sentences occurring in its parent nodes. Let’s
continue to use this format for explanatory stories, but explicitly allow that an
explanatory story may be infinitely tall. Formally, this means that a branch may
contain infinitely many nodes leading up from the root. An explanatory story
is complete iff all of its leaves are occupied by sentences that are basic in the
sense that there is nothing from which they may be inferred in an explanatory
inference.31 Suppose we are given a good explanatory story. A completion of
that explanatory story is a good, complete explanatory story that (properly or
improperly) extends it. For instance, assume that e is an electron, and
(33) e is spin-up
is basic. Consider the explanatory story
¬¬(e is spin-up)
¬¬(e is spin-up) ∨ I’m a monkey’s uncle.
31I allow infinitely tall explanatory stories in order to accommodate the possibility of infinite
descent in the grounding structure among facts. Notice that the definition of a complete
explanatory story permits complete explanatory stories whose branches have no initial node.
Suppose that there is infinite descent of grounds with no fundamental, ungrounded basis.
Then, assuming that the target language has the resources to express all of the facts in
an infinitely descending chain of grounds, the infinite descent may be mirrored by branches
in complete explanatory stories that contain no underived premise. For discussion of the
possibility of infinite descent, see [Bliss, 2013], [Dixon, 2016], [Fine, 2001], [Litland, 2016],






¬¬(e is spin-up) ∨ I’m a monkey’s uncle
is one of its completions. Furthermore, since this second explanatory story has
no good, proper extension, it is its own completion.
In accord with Aristotle’s insight concerning how truth ascriptions are grounded,
instances of Truth-Introduction and STruth-Introduction are explana-
tory inferences. To accommodate the plausible claim that sentences ascribing
truth may figure as premises in explanatory inferences, we allow that such sen-
tences may occupy non-root nodes in complete explanatory stories. So, for
instance, we allow that there is a complete explanatory story of the form
. . .
The General Theory of Relativity is true
The GPS system is useful
where the dots might be filled in by an argument tracing the relations of ground
between certain fundamental features of physical reality and the truth of the
General Theory of Relativity. In accord with the deflationary claim made by
HT, we mark nodes in a complete explanatory story derived by applications
of Truth-Introduction and STruth-Introduction as conduit nodes: the
sentence occupying a conduit node of an explanatory story serves as a mere
placeholder for its grounds. Suppose again that
The General Theory of Relativity is true
The GPS system is useful
is an explanatory inference. If we extend this explanatory story to yield one
of its completions, the truth-ascription will turn out to be a conduit node.
Thus, the role of the ascription of truth to the General Theory of Relativity in
explanatory stories in which it figures is to serve as a mere placeholder for its
physical grounds. When it appears as a premise in a good explanatory story, it
indicates that whatever grounds the fact it states also grounds the fact stated
by anything derived from it. In that sense, it serves as a mere conduit.
We turn out to need a further commitment to do justice to the intuition
here. In particular, we need a principle which ensures that a mere placeholder
cannot be transformed into something “heftier” by the application of a further
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explanatory inference rule. Suppose we accept, in accord with the deflationary
viewpoint we are exploring, that truth ascriptions like
(28) It is true that there are human beings
play no robust role in grounding. Clearly, one cannot obtain something that
does play such a role by applying, say, Existential Introduction to yield
the (vacuous) quantificational claim
(34) (∃x)it is true that there are human beings.
Likewise, the intuitive case in favor of the “lightness” of the existential gen-
eralization ‘Something is true’ is, if anything, stronger than that in favor of
the “lightness” of its instance, ‘The General Theory of Relativity is true.’ Yet,
plausibly, good explanatory stories for ‘Something is true’ always terminate in
an application of Existential Introduction to some truth ascription. Evi-
dently that inference does not yield a conclusion any “heftier” than its premise.
Similarly, in the “postcard” case it is clear that
(35) (17) is true
is “lightweight” just in case
(36) The sentence on side A is true
is “lightweight.” The plausibility of this claim is not reduced at all if we give
(36) a russellian analysis, so that every good explanatory story for it has the
form
. . . . . .
(17) is uniquely a sentence on side A (17) is true
(17) is uniquely a sentence on side A ∧(17) is true
(∃x)(x is uniquely a sentence on side A ∧ x is true).
So, we need some way of accounting for the fact that the applications of Ex-
istential Introduction and Conjunction Introduction in these cases
do not add “metaphysical heft.” A natural way to do so is to endorse the idea
that being a conduit node is inherited : any descendant of a conduit node in a
complete explanatory story is, as it were, fruit of a poisoned tree, and so also a
conduit node.32 Then ψ1, ψ2, ... ground φ iff there is a good explanatory story
32It might be objected that this inheritance principle is too strong, and that being a conduit




E for φ containing only truths, whose branches terminate in leaves occupied
by ψ1, ψ2, ..., and which has no completion in which any of E ’s leaf nodes are
conduit nodes.33
In summary, the core commitments of HT comprise four claims:
1. Instances of Truth-Introduction and STruth-Introduction are ex-
planatory inferences.
2. Nodes in a complete explanatory story derived by applications of Truth-
Introduction and STruth-Introduction are conduit nodes.
3. Any descendant of a conduit node in a complete explanatory story is also
a conduit node.
4. ψ1, ψ2, ... < φ iff there is a good explanatory story E for φ containing
only truths, whose branches terminate in leaves occupied by ψ1, ψ2, ...,
and which has no completion in which any of E ’s leaf nodes are conduit
nodes.
Call a claim hollow iff it appears in a conduit node in some good, complete
explanatory story. If a claim is both hollow and true, it is a hollow truth. The
role of a hollow truth in explanatory stories in which it figures is simply to stand
in for its grounds. Intuitively, we may think of a hollow truth as a light, thin
shell encasing its grounds: the shell functions merely to carry its grounds, which
actually do the metaphysical work of determining (in the way characteristic of
grounding) what is the case. On HT, grounding claims are true when there
is a corresponding explanatory story which is good, whose nodes contain only
truths, and whose leaves contain only non-hollow claims. When there is a good
explanatory story for φ that meets this condition and whose leaves contain
ψ1, ψ2, . . . , we will say that the explanatory story backs the grounding claim
ψ1, ψ2, · · · < φ.34
A couple of examples illustrate HT’s commitments. Let’s suppose that
33In n. 28, I noted that there are exceptions to the schemas (25) and (26), and thus to the
general claim that truth ascriptions are grounded in the facts expressed by the sentences or
propositions to which they ascribe truth. These exceptions are cases in which the erstwhile
grounds are themselves mere conduits. The systematic development of HT in the main text
implies that these are, in fact, the only cases in which those schemas fail. So, not every
instance of the schemas is true, but the schemas hold in a broad class of cases, including
standard cases like the one involving (16) and (28) that Aristotle discussed. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for another journal for indicating that the treatment in the main text did
not make the specification of the class of exceptions obvious.
34I do not intend this terminology to suggest that the fact that an explanatory story is
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(33) e is spin-up
is basic and was asserted by Joe. Then the following, we may assume, is a good
explanatory story.
e is spin-up
it is true that e is spin-up∗ Joe said that e is spin-up
Joe said something true∗
Conduit nodes are marked with asterisks. Any completion of this argument
will either terminate in basic premises from which ‘Joe said that e is spin-up’ is
inferred, or will have branches tracing an infinitely descending structure of ex-
planatory inferences. Call the class of good, complete explanatory stories for φ
the explanatory back-story for φ, and make the plausible assumption that no ap-
plication of Truth-Introduction or STruth-Introduction appears in the
explanatory back-story for ‘Joe said that e is spin-up’.35 On our assumptions,
this explanatory story backs the grounding explanation
(37) e is spin-up, Joe said so < Joe said something true.
because it has no completion of the form
e is spin-up ...
it is true that e is spin-up∗ Joe said that e is spin-up
Joe said something true∗
where either of the nodes containing ‘e is spin-up’ and ‘Joe said that e is spin-up’,
respectively, are mere conduits. Moreover, since the node containing
(38) It is true that e is spin-up
is a mere conduit node, HT entails that no explanatory story backs the ground-
ing explanation
(39) It is true that e is spin-up, Joe said so < Joe said something true.
good is, in any interesting sense, prior to the corresponding grounding explanation. The
only priority I claim here is methodological and local: I will, for the rest of this paper, use
good explanatory stories to establish the truth (according to HT) of corresponding grounding
claims. I remain neutral here on the question of whether good explanatory stories are prior
in any more interesting sense to true grounding explanations.
35This assumption is made solely for the purposes of illustration. But another, related
claim is necessary if HT is to have any plausibility. It would be implausible to deny that the
fact expressed by ‘Joe said that e is spin-up’ has a ground. Given the commitment to the
hollowness of truth ascriptions and the correspondence between true grounding claims and
the availability of a good explanatory story whose leaves are all “hefty,” this will require the
availability of a good explanatory story containing only truths for ‘Joe said that e is spin-up’
whose leaves are all “hefty.”
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So, that grounding explanation is false. Suppose now that e′ is a spin-down
electron, and consider the following explanatory story
e is spin-up
it is true that e is spin-up∗ Joe said that e is spin-up
it is true that e is spin-up and Joe said that e is spin-up∗
Joe said something true∗
Joe said something true or e′ is spin-down∗
As above, no explanatory story backs the grounding explanation
(40) Joe said something true < either Joe said something true or e′ is
spin-down.
But this explanatory story does back
(41) e is spin-up, Joe said so < either Joe said something true or e′ is
spin-down.
Moreover, another explanatory story
e′ is spin-down
Joe said something true or e′ is spin-down
backs
(42) e′ is spin-down < either Joe said something true or e′ is spin-down.
This is the core of HT. (I later consider some generalizations.) I take it to be
supported in some measure by the fact that it accommodates both Aristotle’s
insight concerning how the facts expressed by truth ascriptions are grounded
and the deflationist’s insight that truth ascriptions play no robust explanatory
role. The theory captures Aristotle’s insight straightforwardly, by entailing the
truth of explanations like
(43) There are human beings < it is true that there are human beings.
The deflationist insight is also captured. Suppose again that we want to know
what makes it the case that the GPS system is useful. Recall the plausibility
of appealing to the truth of the General Theory of Relativity in answering our
question. The view at hand does particular justice to the deflationist’s insight
by holding that
(32) the General Theory of Relativity is true
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is serving in any explanatory story we may give as a placeholder – a mere conduit
– for the non-semantic claim that mass warps spacetime, etc. Thus, the truth
of the General Theory of Relativity plays no robust explanatory role. In this
sense, it is “metaphysically lightweight.”
So, both Aristotle’s insight and the deflationist insight are explicated and
accommodated by HT. Moreover, unlike more familiar, disquotationalist views,
HT takes no detour through a theory of the psychological, epistemic, or semantic
role played by truth-ascriptions. So, it is compatible with a wide range of
plausible views on the semantic, epistemic, and cognitive significance of truth-
ascriptions.36 Finally, the sense in which truth-ascriptions are “metaphysically
lightweight” is explained in terms of ground: truth-ascriptions express facts that
are grounded, but that ground nothing. As a result, the sense in which a truth
ascription is “metaphysically lightweight” is as clear as the ground-theoretic
notions in play.
These considerations strike me as powerful reasons in favor of HT. A further
consideration in HT’s favor is that it performs well when applied to the puzzles
stated in §2. Let us, then, turn our attention back to the puzzles, and show how
the application of HT yields a solution.
5 Solutions
Recall the first puzzle we encountered, concerning how the proposition q, that




seems to be a good explanatory story, employing instances of Truth-Introduction
and Existential Introduction. Given that we have a good explanatory
story containing only true claims, it is unclear how we are to avoid concluding
that
(10) (∃x)T (x) ≺ (∃x)T (x).
is true, and thus that there is a reflexive instance of partial ground.
36HT does seem to require that (32) and ‘Mass warps spacetime, etc.’ are semantically
discernible, since, on HT, they express different facts.
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HT avoids this puzzle. The explanatory story given above is not complete.
We may not infer from the existence of such a story anything about what grounds
what, since, for all we have said so far, the leaf node might contain a hollow
truth. To see whether that is so, we need to look at the completions of this
explanatory story. One obvious completion is simply to chain the explanatory







As above, asterisks mark conduit nodes in this explanatory story. This comple-
tion demonstrates that the leaf nodes of the original explanatory story are mere
conduits, so the original explanatory story backs no grounding explanations.
If we just said that, however, we would fall short of a satisfying solution to
the puzzle, which plausibly requires that we offer a principled account of how
the fact stated by ‘(∃x)T (x)’ is grounded. This is easily obtained. Assume that
‘0 = 0’ is a basic truth, let r be the proposition that 0 = 0, and apply our




On HT, this is a good, complete explanatory story containing only true sen-
tences, and the truth occurring in its only leaf is non-hollow. So, on HT the
fact that something is true is grounded in the fact that 0 = 0.37 A similar result
can be obtained by using the fact that snow is white. In fact, any truth whose
explanatory back-story nowhere involves truth-ascriptions will do the trick. So,
we have the satisfying solution we seek.
We also have a solution to Krämer’s puzzle involving the application of
SentQ Introduction to derive ‘(∃S)S’ from itself. HT entails that the rele-
vant application of SentQ Introduction yields a hollow conclusion. On our
assumptions, this explanatory story
37The assumption that ‘0 = 0’ is basic is made solely for the purposes of illustration. If
‘0 = 0’ turns out to be the conclusion of some explanatory inference, whatever that may
be, then there is a complete explanatory story witnessing this fact. Assume no complete
explanatory story for ‘0 = 0’ involves any hollow claims. (If this assumption fails, we may
adapt the illustration by using some other truth better suited for the task.) Then ‘0=0’ is not




It is true that 0 = 0∗
(∃S)S∗
is good, complete, and contains only truths. It thus demonstrates both how the
fact expressed by ‘(∃S)S’ is grounded and that ‘(∃S)S’ is hollow according to
HT.
HT also handles the “postcard” puzzle easily. Recall that that puzzle involved
the sentence
(17) 0 = 0 ∨ (∃s)(s is written on B and s is true)
written on side A of a postcard while
(18) (∃s)(s is written on A and s is true)
is written on side B. Let’s use ‘A’ and ‘B’ to abbreviate the sentences (18) and
‘(∃s)(s is written on B and s is true)’, respectively. The explanatory story
0 = 0
0 = 0 ∨ B
(17) is true∗ (17) is written on A
(17) is written on A and (17) is true∗
A∗
(18) is true∗ (18) is written on B
(18) is written on B and (18) is true∗
B∗
0 = 0 ∨ B∗
(17) is true∗
is good.38 Moreover, on our assumption that ‘0 = 0’ is basic, this explanatory
story demonstrates both how the facts expressed by (17) and (18) are grounded,
and that there are no grounding relations between them. By that token, there
is no reflexive instance of ground in the offing.
6 A problem for internality
A second class of puzzles, taken from [Litland, 2015], uses the assumption that
ground is internal :




Internality if some facts fully ground the fact that φ, then it is impossible for
all of those facts to co-obtain with the fact that φ without fully grounding
it.
(ψ1, ψ2, ... < φ)⇒ (ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ ... ∧ φ⇒ (ψ1, ψ2, ... < φ))
This claim, though somewhat abstruse, is plausible. Suppose we have an ex-
planatory story involving only true sentences which backs a grounding expla-
nation in the actual situation. That very explanatory story actually has what
it takes to back a grounding explanation. So, if we tell this explanatory story,
we say only true things, and the argument genuinely traces the relations of
dependence and determination leading from premises to conclusion. Now con-
sider a possible situation in which that explanatory story still contains only true
sentences. In the possible situation, none of the inferences fails to be explana-
tory. None of the sentences involved in the explanatory story is false. This
means that we could still tell this explanatory story without saying anything
false and without failing to trace relations of dependence and determination
from premises to conclusion. It is hard to imagine what more could be required
in the possible situation to establish a grounding explanation than to produce
such an explanatory story.39
Litland shows, however, that internality, together with plausible principles
governing ground, turns out to be at odds with the idea that ground is transitive
and asymmetric, and hence irreflexive. Suppose that, in the actual situation,
we are presented with the following sentences, labeled as shown:
(Lg) 0 = 0
(Rg) (D) is true
(L) (Lg) is true
(R) (Rg) is true
(D) (Lg) is true or (Rg) is true.
Each of these sentences is straightforwardly true. The labels are chosen with
the following mnemonic in mind: (D) is a disjunction; its left-hand disjunct is
39See [Bennett, 2011] for a different defense of internality. The theoretical significance of
internality goes beyond its plausibility. Litland [2015] shows that, if, in general, grounds for
φ necessitate φ, then internality is a commitment of each of the extant proposals [Bennett,
2011, Dasgupta, 2014, Litland, 2016] for systematically answering the question of what grounds
grounding facts. Sider [2020] suggests a number of relatively unsystematic proposals.
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(L); its right-hand disjunct is (R); (Lg) is supposed to be the ground for (L);
and (Rg) is supposed to be the ground for (R).
One important stipulation regarding the interpretation of these sentences
bears mention. The occurrences of ‘(D)’ and the other sentence labels in the
sentences themselves are not intended to be interpreted as names of the relevant
sentences, but rather stand in for russellian definite descriptions. For instance,
in the statement of (Rg), ‘(D) is true’ is to be interpreted as an abbreviation of
the existential generalization
(44) There is something which is both uniquely a sentence with label ‘(D)’
and true.
This wrinkle ensures that (L) and (R) are existential generalizations. Like many
other facts expressed by existential generalizations, this allows that they might
have been grounded by facts other than the facts which actually ground them.
For instance, the fact that someone is the U.S. president is actually grounded
in the fact that Trump in particular is; but it might have been grounded in
Clinton’s being the U.S. President instead. The availability of other possible
grounds for (L) and (R) turns out to be crucial for the statement of the puzzle.
What grounds what in the actual situation? Instances of STruth-Introduction
and Existential Introduction are explanatory inferences. So, it is plausible
that in general, for any truth φ, each instance of the schemas
Existential Grounding φ(α) ≺ (∃x)φ[x/α]
Truth Grounding φ ≺ pφq is true
is also true. As before, we assume that instances of Disjunction Introduc-
tion are explanatory inferences. So, for any truth φ, it is also plausible to think
that instances of
Left Disjunctive Grounding φ < (φ ∨ ψ)
Right Disjunctive Grounding φ < (ψ ∨ φ)
are true. This gives us (partial) grounding relations indicated by the arrows in:
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(D) : (Lg) is true ∨ (Rg) is true
,,
(L) : (Lg) is true
44
(R) : (Rg) is true
jj
(Lg) : 0 = 0
OO
(Rg) : (D) is true
OO
Because (partial) ground is transitive and asymmetric, the presence of a cycle
in the diagram indicates a contradiction.
Following Fine, Litland suggests that we may avoid this problem by denying
the validity of Left and Right Disjunctive Grounding. Assuming that
(φ ∨ ψ) is true, we should rely instead on the validity of
Weak Disjunctive Grounding φ < (φ ∨ ψ) or ψ < (φ ∨ ψ)40
Then, the other grounding principles yield this picture
(D) : (Lg) is true ∨ (Rg) is true
,,
(L) : (Lg) is true (R) : (Rg) is true
(Lg) : 0 = 0
OO
(Rg) : (D) is true
OO
Weak Disjunctive Grounding requires that the fact expressed by (D) is fully
grounded by some fact expressed by one of its disjuncts. If the fact expressed by
(R) grounded the fact expressed by (D), we would have a contradiction. Litland
concludes that
(45) (Lg) is true < ((Lg) is true ∨ (Rg) is true)
is a true grounding explanation in the actual situation.
Now consider a counterfactual situation in which ‘(Lg)’ and ‘(Rg)’ label
different sentences:
40A fully satisfying solution would offer a principled motivation for rejecting the stronger
disjunctive grounding principles in favor of Weak Disjunctive Grounding. Litland offers
one, appealing to the way in which a fact obtains. Let’s grant that the way a fact obtains
is given by those of its good explanatory stories which contain only true premises. Then,
Litland suggests, the disjunctive grounding principles will fail when the way the disjunct
obtains involves the disjunction. As the arrows indicate, the way that (R) obtains in the
actual situation involves (D).
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(Lg) (D) is true.
(Rg) 1 = 1
Assume that, in the counterfactual situation, the rest of the sentences are
uniquely labeled as they actually are. Again, all of the sentences would be
straightforwardly true in this situation. Application of our grounding principles
yields this picture:
(D) : (Lg) is true ∨ (Rg) is true
rr
(L) : (Lg) is true (R) : (Rg) is true
jj
(Lg) : (D) is true
OO
(Rg) : 1 = 1
OO
In this counterfactual situation, Litland concludes,
(46) (Lg) is true 6< ((Lg) is true ∨ (Rg) is true).
If Litland’s claims are correct, then the fact expressed by (L) actually (fully)
grounds that expressed by (D), but might have co-obtained with that fact with-
out grounding it. This contradicts internality.
We can solve the puzzle by simply giving up on internality.41 An assumption
of the puzzle, then, is that ground is internal. If one denies this, then the
erstwhile puzzle turns out to be a result which specifies conditions under which
internality fails.
At the beginning of this section we noted that internality is plausible. But
that abstract and impressionistic defense of internality confronts the problem
posed by the puzzle. If there were no alternative, internality would have to
go. Fortunately, there are a number of other principles in play, and denying
any of those would evade the puzzle. In fact, HT denies the validity of all of
the schematic grounding principles we have stated: when the left-hand side of
any instance of Existential Grounding, Truth Grounding, Left Dis-
junctive Grounding, or Right Disjunctive Grounding is hollow, each
of those schemas fails. Similarly, Weak Disjunctive Grounding fails when
41This is Litland’s solution, though he proposes a weaker sense in which ground turns out to
be internal. Of course, one can also give up the claim that ground is transitive and asymmetric.
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both disjuncts are hollow truths.42 This is the sense in which, according to
HT, hollow truths are “metaphysically lightweight.” Even so, HT is consistent
with the plausible paradigm cases of grounding explanations involving existen-
tial generalizations, disjunctions, and truth-ascriptions which motivate theorists
to propose these schemas. More generally, the view holds that the default case is
one in which these schemas are valid. They fail only when some truth-ascription
figures in the explanatory back-story. So, all of these principles fail, particularly
in application to (L), (R), and (D).
If we just said that, however, we would fall short of a satisfying solution to
the puzzle, which plausibly requires that we offer a principled account of how the
facts stated by (D), (L), and (R) are grounded. This is easily obtained. Assume
that ‘0 = 0’ is a basic truth in the actual situation. On HT, the conclusions of
instances of STruth-Introduction are hollow: their function in explanatory
stories is to indicate that whatever grounds the facts they express also grounds
the facts expressed by anything derived from them. Assume that the explana-
tory back-story for ‘(Lg) says that 0 = 0’ contains no truth-ascription. Then,
no leaf of this explanatory story
0 = 0 (Lg) says that 0 = 0
(L): (Lg) is true∗
(D): (Lg) is true∨ (Rg) is true∗
contains a hollow truth.43 Thus, this explanatory story will back a grounding
explanation
(47) 0 = 0, (Lg) says that 0 = 0 < ((Lg) is true ∨ (Rg) is true).
Similarly, the explanatory story
0 = 0 (Lg) says that 0 = 0
(L): (Lg) is true∗
(D): (Lg) is true∨ (Rg) is true∗ (D) says that (Lg) is true∨ (Rg) is true
(Rg): (D) is true∗
backs
42Thus, HT’s acceptance requires a logic of ground that is somewhat more complex than
the prominent treatment in [Fine, 2012b]. HT shares this feature with every extant proposed
solution to the puzzles. In fact, it is not clear how to systematically characterize the logic
of ground on HT. I leave the question to further work. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
making this point.
43‘(Lg) is true’ stands in for a claim containing a russellian definite description, so this
explanatory story omits inferences involving the claim that the sentence ‘0 = 0’ is uniquely
labeled ‘(Lg)’. Similar remarks apply to the other explanatory stories displayed in this section.
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(48) 0 = 0, (Lg) says that 0 = 0 < (D) is true.44
Extending the explanatory story still further backs
(49) 0 = 0, (Lg) says that 0 = 0 < (Rg) is true.
So, here are the grounding relations in the actual situation according to HT:
(D) : (Lg) is true ∨ (Rg) is true
(L) : (Lg) is true (R) : (Rg) is true




// (Rg) : (D) is true
This is a pleasing picture if we are tempted by the deflationist’s idea that truth
ascriptions play no robust explanatory role. The fact that 0 = 0, together with
the facts about what the sentences say, does all the grounding work; facts stated
by truth-ascriptions do nothing, just as the deflationist says.
Something similar goes for the grounding relations in the possible situation:
(D) : (Lg) is true ∨ (Rg) is true
(L) : (Lg) is true (R) : (Rg) is true





Finally, there is no counter-example to internality here. The sentence ac-
tually uniquely labeled (Lg) says something that the sentence labeled (Lg) in
the counterfactual situation does not say. So, the (full) ground for (D) in the
actual situation does not obtain in the counterfactual situation. In fact, a virtue
of the solution provided by HT is that it locates the source of the differences
44To prevent clutter, I simplify this grounding claim and the one below by omitting facts
concerning what certain of the sentences say from the grounds.
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in grounding between the actual situation and the possible situation so plausi-
bly: the grounding connections are different in the two situations because the
relevant sentences say different things in those situations.
7 Objections
There are a number of objections one might make to HT. I will not attempt
here to vindicate HT against every such objection. There are, however, five ob-
jections that illuminate some of HT’s most interesting features and limitations.
7.1 Grounds vs. causes
The first of these objections is that, contrary to what I have claimed, HT does
not really capture the deflationist’s insight. HT is expressed in terms of ground-
ing explanations. Disquotationalists and deflationists have explicitly concerned
themselves, however, with the claim that truth ascriptions play no robust role in
causal explanations [Field, 1994], [Horwich, 1990]. So, deflationists about truth
might complain that HT fails to do justice to the spirit of the deflationist’s
insight.
It is straightforward to generalize HT to handle causal explanations. The
idea would be that, though facts expressed by truth-ascriptions don’t cause any-
thing, their grounds do. It seems that the intuitive considerations favoring the
claim that truth ascriptions play no robust role in grounding have analogues
that favor claiming that truth ascriptions play no robust role in causing. Sup-
pose, for instance, that you used a GPS device to navigate to your in-laws’ home
for a holiday meal. It is plausible to think that the General Theory of Relativity
is not in the right place to play a role in causing your arrival. Assuming this
intuition is on target, the proponent of HT should say here that the truth of
the General Theory of Relativity does not cause your arrival at your in-laws.45
Instead, the relevant aspects of physical reality play that causal role.
45There are views concerning the nature of causation on which the intuition here is not on
target. I have in mind views which analyze causation by appeal to counterfactual dependence.
On standard views of counterfactual dependence, since, necessarily, the General Theory of
Relativity is true iff mass warps spacetime, etc., the truth of the theory and the relevant
features of physical reality play the same role in counterfactual dependence. See [Wilson,
2018] for an attempt to offer more fine-grained accounts of counterfactual dependence, which
may allow appeal to counter-possible divergences between the truth of the theory and the




One might hold that disjunctions are “metaphysically lightweight,” in just the
way that truth-ascriptions are,46 and object to HT that it does not characterize
the lightness of truth ascriptions in a way suitably analogous to the alleged light-
ness of disjunctions. On HT, disjunctions are not “metaphysically lightweight”
in the way that truth-ascriptions are; the objector concludes for this reason
that HT is unacceptable. I myself doubt that analogues of the motivations for
the deflationist’s insight are plausible in the case of disjunctions, but let’s sup-
pose that I am wrong about that. It turns out that HT can be generalized to
yield a view on which large swathes of facts in addition to truth ascriptions
are “metaphysically lightweight.” For instance, we can generalize HT by say-
ing that claims derived by Disjunction Introduction, like those derived by
Truth-Introduction or STruth-Introduction, are hollow. In fact, a sim-
ilar sort of generalization is available to any view on which some swath of truths
is “metaphysically lightweight,” so long as we can characterize those truths as
the conclusions of some class of explanatory inferences.47
One might also wonder about other, more radical generalizations. One might
wonder, for instance, whether every fully grounded truth has the feature that
HT attributes to truth ascriptions. Call this view the generalized HT. On the
generalized HT, the facts expressed by fully grounded truths ground nothing;
and, though fully grounded truths figure in explanatory arguments, they serve
in those arguments as mere placeholders for their grounds.48
The generalized HT is implausible. We have seen that the deflationist’s
claim that truth ascriptions play no robust explanatory role is highly plausible,
as was illustrated by the fact that the truth of the General Theory of Relativity
was, on reflection, not among the grounds of the utility of the GPS system.
By contrast, the analogue of the deflationist’s insight for other fully grounded
claims is implausible. Suppose, for instance, that the wrongness of telling lies (in
circumstances C) is fully grounded in some further facts. It seems implausible
to think that
(50) It is wrong to tell lies (in circumstances C)
46See [Lewis, 1986, p. 61], [Fodor, 1974, pp. 109-110], and [Kim, 1993], each of which argues
that facts or properties expressed disjunctively play no determinative role. The discussion of
disjunctions in [deRosset, 2017] may be relevant in this connection.
47Thanks to Gideon Rosen and Selim Berker for discussion of the issues raised here.
48Thanks to Matti Eklund for suggesting this generalization of HT.
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is hollow. That is, it is implausible to think that (50) itself does no further
explanatory work, but instead serves merely as a placeholder for its grounds in
explanatory arguments in which it figures. So, to adapt an example discussed
by Simon Blackburn, it is highly plausible to think that it is wrong to get your
little brother to tell lies (in C) partly in virtue of its being wrong to tell lies
(in C) [Blackburn, 1984]. Something similar goes for facts involving genes or
clades. So, for instance, a truth of the form
(51) These soybean seeds have gene G
is as “hefty” as one could hope for, even though the fact it expresses is, pre-
sumably, fully grounded by certain physical and chemical facts. It appears that
one such truth expresses a fact that partially grounds the fact that plants grown
from certain seeds are “Roundup ready” – that is, resistant to certain herbicides.
I conclude that, though HT can be generalized, considerations of plausibility
set bounds on how far such a generalization should go. Nevertheless, it is clear
that HT provides resources for anyone who wishes to vindicate analogues of
the deflationist’s insight for other classes of facts. So long as the target class
of facts can be characterized as the ones expressed by the conclusions of some
class of explanatory inferences, HT exemplifies a general strategy for claiming
that those facts play no robust explanatory role.
7.3 Epistemic versions of the puzzles
Another objection is inspired by the fact that there are analogues of Fine’s
original puzzle that involve knowledge and other epistemic notions. Krämer
[forthcoming], for instance, notes the plausibility of the idea that Joe’s knowing
that φ is partially grounded in φ. If we take this plausible claim in full generality,
then, assuming Joe knows that he knows something, it seems to follow that
Joe’s knowing that he knows something is partially self-grounded. One of the
difficulties in considering how HT might handle a puzzle of this sort is that
it is simply unclear how explanatory stories for epistemic facts go.49 Here
however, is a natural way to state a puzzle of this sort. One might hold that,
49For example, it is unclear whether good explanatory stories for knowledge ascriptions infer
them from truth ascriptions, as they would on a Chisholm-style analysis of knowledge as true
belief of a certain sort. Since HT would then straightforwardly apply to entail the hollowness
of knowledge ascriptions, let us assume that this is not how epistemic facts are grounded.
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on the assumption that S knows that φ, instances of the following schema are
generally true:
Epistemic Grounding φ ≺ S knows that φ.
Assume that Joe knows that Joe knows something. Given Existential Ground-
ing (or some appropriate analogue),50 we appear to have
(52) Joe knows that Joe knows something < Joe knows something ≺ Joe
knows that Joe knows something.
Given the transitivity of partial ground, this entails a reflexive instance of partial
ground.
HT already handles this class of puzzles, given the wide ambit of completions
for good explanatory stories. To illustrate the application of HT, it will be help-
ful to switch to an example where, unlike in the case of knowledge, identifying
the backing explanatory stories is easy. Suppose that Joe uses an intransitive
verb ‘t-believes’ and that his use of this intransitive verb intuitively corresponds
to our notion of believing something that is the case. So, for instance, if Joe
believes that grass is green, then, as he would put it, he t-believes. Suppose
further that we insist that all good, complete explanatory stories for the claim
‘Joe t-believes’ terminate in an explanatory inference of the form
T-Belief Introduction Joe believes that φ φ
Joe t-believes.
Assume that Joe t-believes and is perceptive enough to believe that he t-believes.
Then, the explanatory story
Joe believes that Joe t-believes Joe t-believes
Joe t-believes
is good and contains only truths. It therefore seems hard to resist the claim
that there is a reflexive instance of partial ground:
(53) Joe t-believes ≺ Joe t-believes.
50Epistemic Grounding and Existential Grounding are used here solely for illustration.
The exact means of regimenting the explanatory story for the claim we colloquially express by
‘Joe knows something’ may differ significantly. One way of regimenting the claim, for instance,
uses first-order quantification over propositions. Another uses higher-order quantification into
sentential position. The response below is neutral on the differences between them.
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But HT already entails that the claim that Joe t-believes is hollow. This is
because the explanatory back-story for ‘Joe t-believes’ will include truth ascrip-
tions. HT therefore entails that ‘Joe t-believes’ is hollow. So, for instance, on
HT, there is a completion of our explanatory story of the form:
. . . . . . 0 = 0
. . . Joe believes that it is true that 0 = 0 it is true that 0 = 0∗
Joe believes that Joe t-believes Joe t-believes∗
Joe t-believes∗
HT is thus already committed to the hollowness of the claim that Joe t-believes:
the fact expressed by that claim grounds nothing.51 So, on HT it does not
(even partially) ground itself.
The explanatory stories that back grounding explanations for knowledge
ascriptions are not so easily specified, but the lesson in the case of t-beliefs
transfers readily. Whatever the explanatory story for the claim that Joe knows
something may be, it will have a wide range of completions. Some of those
completions involve truth. For instance, there will be some good, complete
explanatory story for ‘Joe knows something’ on which it is inferred from claims
that include a lemma ‘it is true that 0 = 0’ via ‘Joe knows that it is true
that 0 = 0’. The claim that Joe knows something has a truth ascription in its
explanatory back-story. Thus, it will be hollow on HT.
7.4 Inheritance
The last two objections, unlike the ones we have already considered, target core
commitments of HT. The first of the two concerns the idea that the hollowness of
51It might be objected that, in the case at hand, Joe has no such belief. Recall, however,
that good explanatory stories may contain falsehoods; we introduced the idea of a good
explanatory story in §1 by appeal to this argument:
It’s windy.
So, either it’s windy or it’s snowy.
As we saw, this is a good explanatory story, even if (as it turns out) the weather is neither
windy nor snowy. Similarly, basic claims need not be true. So, instances of the argument form
in the main text that demonstrate the hollowness of ‘Joe t-believes’ may be completions of
Joe believes that Joe t-believes Joe t-believes
Joe t-believes
despite containing falsehoods. Generally, HT is a view on which hollowness is a necessary
feature of any claim that has it, and its possession is independent of how things contingently
turn out to be.
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a truth ascription is inherited by anything inferred from it in a good explanatory
story. That commitment was motivated by the fact that some explanatory
inferences evidently preserve hollowness. As we saw, if
(35) (17) is true
is hollow, then clearly so too is
(36) The sentence on side A is true
even though the latter is not the conclusion of any application of Truth-
Introduction or STruth-Introduction. HT’s commitment to inheritance
secures the hollowness of (36).
It might be objected, however, that this commitment is stronger than is
necessary for the job. The inheritance principle we have adopted says, in ef-
fect, that if a truth ascription appears anywhere in the explanatory back-story
for a claim, then that claim is hollow. A weaker alternative would hold in-
stead that hollowness is inherited only if every good, complete explanatory story
for the claim somewhere involved an application of Truth-Introduction or
STruth-Introduction. It is plausible to think that every good, complete ex-
planatory story for (36) contains some application of STruth-Introduction
So, this weaker alternative would entail the sensible idea that (36) is hollow.
On the other hand, the weaker inheritance principle wold not classify
(54) Something is true ∨ 0 = 0
as hollow, since, assuming ‘0 = 0’ is basic,
0 = 0
Something is true ∨ 0 = 0
is good, complete, and nowhere contains an application of either Truth-Introduction
or STruth-Introduction. The full-strength inheritance principle required by
HT is far less obvious, the objector contends, than this weaker alternative. But
the full-strength inheritance principle is required for solutions to some of the
puzzles, including the “postcard” puzzle, Krämer’s version involving ‘(∃S)S’ and
the epistemic version of the puzzle.
It seems to me that, if we are attracted to the idea that ‘Something is true’
is hollow, we should also embrace the idea that (54) is hollow. It turns out that
the ground-theoretic commitments of a version of HT which includes only the
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weaker inheritance principle are less plausible, on the whole, than those of the
original version of HT. Let s be the proposition that either something is true or
0 = 0, and consider the explanatory story
0 = 0
(∃x)T (x) ∨ 0 = 0
Ts◦
(∃x)T (x)◦
(∃x)T (x) ∨ 0 = 0.
We may assume that this explanatory story is good, complete, and contains only
truths. The superscripted symbol ‘◦’ marks claims that are hollow according
to the revision of HT that affirms only the weaker inheritance principle. On
this weakening of HT, the fact expressed by (54) grounds itself, but the fact
expressed by ‘(∃x)T (x)’ does not. Also, the fact expressed by (54) grounds the
fact expressed by its left-hand disjunct, but the fact expressed by the disjunct
does not ground the fact expressed by the disjunction. This is an implausible
combination of grounding claims. Perhaps we might be driven by the puzzles to
admit reflexive instances of grounding, but, if this explanatory story indicates
that ‘(∃x)T (x) ∨ 0 = 0’ provides a reflexive instance, the same should be said
about ‘(∃x)T (x)’. Similarly, reflection on this explanatory story might perhaps
bring us to accept the initially implausible idea that the disjunction grounds its
disjunct. But the plausibility of the view that the disjunct returns the favor is
at least as strong.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the hollowness of (54) is immediately
apparent, or even as apparent as the hollowness of ‘The General Theory of Rela-
tivity is true’. I have urged the intuitive plausibility of the broadly deflationary
idea that truth ascriptions are hollow, but the considerations that favor the
full-strength inheritance principle over the weakening under consideration are
less direct. It turns out that HT provides a way of systematizing the intuitive
idea that truth ascriptions are hollow whose commitments are, taken together,
more plausible than the weakening we have considered.
Inclusion of the full-strength inheritance claim in HT sometimes yields ini-
tially surprising verdicts about which claims are hollow. So, for instance, we
might be surprised to learn that the epistemic claim that Joe knows something
turns out to be hollow. In retrospect, though, this result is not particularly
surprising. It is not at all surprising to learn that truly believing something is
truth-involving, and so claims attributing it are hollow. Similar remarks apply
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to t-believing. Since knowing something plausibly involves either truly believing
something or, at least, t-believing,52 it seems quite natural, on the strand of
deflationism we are considering, to hold that claims that someone knows some-
thing are hollow. Still, there may be other cases in which a claim of hollowness is
unexpected, even in retrospect. I haven’t yet seen any such cases, but this is an
important direction for further work. For proponents of HT, such cases might
furnish opportunities for new applications; for opponents, they might furnish
premises for new objections.53
7.5 Generalizations of Aristotle’s insight
Recall that HT requires exceptions to
Truth Grounding φ < it is true that φ.
This requirement follows from ideas at the heart of HT, that truth ascriptions
themselves play no robust explanatory role, and that the thinness of that role
should be explicated by the idea that the facts expressed by truth ascriptions
ground nothing. So, if φ is itself a truth ascription, then, according to HT, the
fact stated by φ does not ground anything, including the fact that it is true that
φ. Thus, HT denies
(55) It is true that there are human beings < it is true that it is true that
there are human beings.
The objection is that Truth Grounding (and analogous principles covering
sentential truth ascriptions, being the case, etc.) in its full generality enjoys basic
plausibility, and that these core commitments of HT are therefore implausible.54
It should be noted that similar objections may be formulated with respect to
all of the grounding principles used in the puzzles. So, HT requires exceptions
to
Left Disjunctive Grounding φ < (φ ∨ ψ)
52In n. 49 I assumed for the sake of argument that knowing something does not involve
truly believing it. Since, as I have argued, HT yields the hollowness of ‘Joe knows something’
whether or not we make this assumption, I have dropped it here.
53Thanks to both Zoë A. Johnson King and an anonymous referee for independently in-
dicating both the need to defend the full-strength inheritance principle and articulating the
concomitant worry that it would imply surprising and implausible consequences concerning
the hollowness of various claims.
54Thanks to Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra for discussion of an objection along these lines.
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in cases in which φ is a truth ascription. In particular, HT requires the rejection
of
(56) It is true that there are human beings < (it is true that there are human
beings ∨ 0 = 1).
And it might be held that such principles are so plausible that a theory which
rejects them is unacceptable.
Principles like Truth Grounding and Left Disjunctive Grounding
enjoy some plausibility. It seems to me, however, that their plausibility stems
from the profound plausibility of the particular cases which motivate them. So,
for instance, as we have seen several times, Aristotle’s insight that
(43) there are human beings < it is true that there are human beings.
is powerfully plausible. Similarly,
(57) there are human beings < (there are human beings ∨ 0 = 1)
is powerfully plausible. Because of the plausibility of these particular claims,
their natural schematic generalizations are also plausible. We should be wary,
however, of generalizing from the plausibility of particular cases to a problematic
general principle. Moreover, one lesson of the puzzles is that some plausible
principle governing ground will have to go.
As we have seen HT entails the truth of (43) and (57), given plausible an-
cillary premises. What’s more, it provides a principled basis on which to distin-
guish true instances of, e.g., Truth Grounding from untrue instances. That
principled basis itself is intuitively motivated by the deflationist insight that
truth ascriptions may figure in explanatory arguments, but don’t themselves
state facts that ground anything. Finally, HT relies on a neglected distinction
between two of the many different things that philosophers have called “expla-
nations:” explanatory stories and the facts stated by true grounding claims.55
Though HT denies Truth Grounding, it asserts that all instances of Truth-
Introduction are explanatory. So, the plausibility of Truth Grounding
can be diagnosed as the result of running together the idea that an explanatory
55See [Shapiro, 1998, p. 505] for a use of ‘explanation’ for an explanatory story which
is relevant to the present discussion. Shapiro argues there that truth ascriptions are an
ineliminable part of certain explanatory stories; HT offers a way of seeing that this is consistent




story is good (and contains only truths) and the idea that its corresponding
grounding explanation is true.56
8 Conclusion
Our discussion of HT has been brief. There is much that remains to be worked
out. In particular, HT leaves central issues in the theory of truth unaddressed.
First, HT is a theory of the lightness of truth: what truth’s being “metaphys-
ically lightweight” comes to. HT does not offer a traditional analysis of the
nature of truth; at least, no theory is proposed here that purports to provide
interesting necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being true or to
exhaustively articulate the nature of truth. In this way, HT differs from some of
the more traditional attempts to define truth that might figure, e.g., in a corre-
spondence theory of truth.57 It also differs in this way from deflationary views
which claim that some collection of non-paradoxical instances of the T -schema
offer an exhaustive account of the nature of truth. One lesson of the cogency
of HT is that we can clearly explain the sense in which truth is “metaphysically
lightweight” without endorsing any such analysis of truth. Second, nothing in
our discussion addresses the semantic paradoxes in any way. I will leave an
examination of the relationship between HT and the semantic paradoxes for
56It might nevertheless be held that denying (55) and (56) is too implausible. If so, then we
can ramify HT to yield a theory on which both claims come out true. We can assign degree
0 to all claims for which all good, complete explanatory stories are truth-free; degree 1 to all
claims for which all good, complete, explanatory stories contain at most degree 0 claims in
non-root nodes; and so on through all of the ordinals. The degree of a claim φ is unbounded if,
for every α, there is a β > α such that some good, complete explanatory story for φ contains a
degree β claim at some non-root node. (More formally, the inductive definition of degree is as
follows: the degree of a claim is 0 if its explanatory back-story contains no truth-ascriptions,
and is otherwise the least ordinal (if there is one) greater than the degree of every claim
occupying a non-root node in its explanatory back-story.) The truth ascriptions that give rise
to the puzzles we have considered all have unbounded degree. Then HT might be weakened
so that an explanatory story is permitted to back a true grounding explanation when its
conclusion has a bounded degree. Since, presumably, ‘it is true that that there are human
beings’ has degree 1, this would allow us to avoid the puzzles while affirming (55). Something
similar holds for (56). I don’t myself think that (55) and (56) are particularly plausible prima
facie, so the extra complication involved in ramification seems to me unwarranted. You may
think differently.
57HT is in principle compatible with traditional attempts to analyze truth of the sort exem-
plified by correspondence theories of truth. It nevertheless sits uneasily beside such attempts,
since the combination of HT with such an analysis seems to require that we motivate the
claim that the proposed analysans is itself hollow. I leave the question of how to sensibly




Still, the puzzles we have encountered are interesting, and the solutions that
HT offers to them are attractive. There are, as one might expect, other pro-
posals in the literature for solving these and related puzzles.59 Considerations
of space prevent me from discussing these alternative solutions in any detail
here. My conclusion is, therefore, modest: HT offers solutions worth taking
seriously. I believe the stronger claim that its solutions are better than other
extant alternatives, but haven’t begun to show that here.
Suppose that HT is ultimately acceptable. Then we have a concrete demon-
stration of the utility of the theory of ground. That theory gives us the materials
to offer a clear explication of an important strand of deflationism about truth.
It also offers, in its proposed solutions to the puzzles, a new source of potential
evidence favoring that theory. The theory of ground would thereby serve the
theory of truth. So, insofar as we are interested in deflationism about truth,
we should also be interested in the theory of ground. I have assumed from the
beginning that skepticism about ground may be set aside. I offered no explicit
argument against such skepticism. But the utility of HT offers a kind of re-
sponse to skeptics: the notion of ground turns out to be theoretically useful. To
my mind, this is the best kind of response.60
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